Will deepfakes become the most powerful tool of misinformation ever seen? Can we mitigate, or govern, against the coming onslaught of synthetic media?
Our research focuses on the risks that deepfakes create. We highlight risks at three levels: the individual, the organizational and the societal. In each case, knowing how to respond means investigating to better understand the risks of what and to whom. And it’s important to note that these risks don’t necessarily involve malicious intent. Typically, if an individual or an organization faces a deepfake risk, it’s because they’ve been targeted in some way – for example, non-consensual pornography at the individual level, or fraud against an organization. But on the societal level, one of the things our research highlights is that the potential harm from deepfakes is not necessarily intentional: the growing prevalence of synthetic media can stoke concerns about fundamental social values like trust and truth.
“Echo chambers are not a new thing but the real replication of these memes happens online. Until now, a lot of polarization research has been around content production because this is what we can easily measure. This population of Firefox users consented to share their data – it’s like some people donate blood for the common good, here people donated their data for the common good,” said Head of the Data Science Lab, Assistant Professor Robert West, and the study’s lead author.
Whilst there have been previous, smaller studies that measured engagement in different ways, uniquely this new study was conducted in vivo, with users going about their normal daily lives, meaning that researchers were able to follow people in their natural habitat. With access to browsing history, unlike earlier studies, this research measured the time that users spent on particular websites, and reading particular articles, rather than whether a user had visited a site or not.
This additional data provided new evidence of a greater extent of polarization than observed in prior literature, showing that people engaged much more deeply with articles matching their political persuasion, spending more time on news sources matching their partisan beliefs than other information sources. […]
Due to the Coronavirus pandemic, we switched to a hybrid mode, meaning that participants will also have the option to attend the conferences online at live.stcc.ch
Criminal hackers have a long history of sharing experiences, tools, and vulnerabilities; this has contributed to the success of major cyberattacks. The goal of this conference is to explore various measures to make cooperation, information sharing and collective intelligence also effective on the defender side.
As early as twenty years ago, the first Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) were established as a central resource for sharing information on cyber threats to critical infrastructure. In the same vein, threat intelligence platforms help organizations aggregate, correlate, and analyze threat data from multiple sources in (almost) real-time to support defensive actions. Open source solutions have also been proposed as a counterweight to «black-hat» hackers successfully working together, for instance the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) or the Open Threat Exchange (OTX), a crowd-sourced computer-security platform.
The Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) discipline, based on intelligence techniques and methods, aims to collect and filter all relevant information from the cyberspace, in order to draw up portraits of attackers, threats or technological trends (sectors of activity affected, methods used, etc.). CTI sources include open source intelligence, social media intelligence, human Intelligence, technical intelligence or intelligence from the deep and dark web. Thus, the tools used by large Security Operations Centers (SOCs), produce hundreds of millions of events per day, from endpoint and network alerts to log events, making it difficult to filter down to a manageable number of suspicious events for triage.
All in all, this profiling enables early detection of cyberattacks and better anticipation of cyber-risks. However, a proper threat intelligence approach should be complemented by technology intelligence, an activity that enables organizations to monitor and forecast the technological opportunities and threats that could affect the future growth and survival of their business. As emphasized by the National strategy for the protection of Switzerland against cyber risks (NCS, 2018-2022), an early identification of technological trends constitutes an important aspect for developing the Swiss cyber-defence. In that respect, the armasuisse CYD Campus cordially invites all stakeholders to bridge the gaps between academia, the industry, and governmental organizations working in the field of cyber-defence.
Registration Chair: Monia Khelifi
Program Chair: Dr. Alain Mermoud
Conference Fee: CHF 100.- one day, CHF 200.- both days, free of charge for students and government employees
Please note your will have to wear a mask except if you eat at a table (more information in the attached security concept).